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February 21, 1952

O.I.R. CONTRIBUTION TO

SE-22: CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE U.S. COURSES OF ACTION
WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR THAILAND

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I. PRIOR TO ANY IDENTIFIABLE CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR THAILAND:

A. What is the likelihood that the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand would agree in advance to join with the United States in taking military counter-action against Communist China in the event of an identifiable Chinese Communist military intervention in Indochina, Burma, or Thailand?

1. General

The United Kingdom. Although the UK would probably agree in advance to consult with the US in taking some kind of military action against the Chinese Communists in the event indicated, it would not give blanket preliminary agreement to such action against Communist China itself or readily join in it, for the following general reasons:

- (1) The UK continues to view the Far East as a region third in importance, after Western Europe and the Middle East, to the preservation of major British world interests and security;
- (2) The UK will generally fear that military action against Communist China, once agreed upon in advance and then instituted, will prove impossible to limit and will probably lead to World War III;
- (3) The present official British inclination will be to avoid hard and fast commitments to the US in advance and to insist upon deciding what constitutes appropriate supporting action on the basis of the facts of each given situation; and
- (4) In reaching any decision the UK government will be strongly influenced by prevalent parliamentary and public opinion. (At the present time, British opinion is increasingly critical of US actions and statements concerning the Far East; the British apparently fear -- especially the Laborites -- that the US is now prepared to follow a "hard" policy toward Communist China which is substantially similar to the MacArthur viewpoint favoring direct action against the mainland of China.)

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On the other hand, the Conservative government and possibly a majority of the people would view a Chinese Communist attack on any one of the countries named as a more serious threat to world peace than the aggression against the Republic of Korea. The attacks would be interpreted as fairly clear indications of a Chinese-Soviet intention to "roll up the carpet" in South Asia, even at the risk of general war and possibly with the calculation of precipitating the war. Even more sobering to the British would be the realization that once the Chinese Communists launch an attack at any one of the threatened countries, the British position in Malaya is in great jeopardy, unless the attacks can be localized and defeated. However viewed, the situation created by Communist attacks on South Asian countries will pose bigger policy problems for the British than the Korean war has posed. The present evidence indicates, however, that the UK government, while not optimistic about Chinese Communist intentions toward South Asia, is, at the same time, not yet prepared to make any formal commitments to the US covering all the possible courses of action outlined in this problem.

Australia and New Zealand share the British alarm about the possibility of spreading conflict in the Far East, but because their stake in regional security is greater and their dependence on the US for security is paramount, they would be much less inclined to challenge US military counteraction in principle. It is doubtful,

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however, whether either country would give prior support to any of the courses of action outlined in I-A.

France. Despite admitted Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh in technical aid, equipment, and troop training, official French policy is still one of the "no provocation" of Communist China, and the French desire to avoid, if possible, an open clash with the Chinese which, they fear, would lead to a major war.

The French Government, however, would probably agree in advance to military action against Communist China in the event of a full-scale invasion by the Chinese Army of Indochina and possibly Thailand, because of its contiguity to Laos. The French would strenuously oppose the extension of such an agreement to cover Burma but, might consent if Burma were included in a broad agreement covering all three areas. Such a concession would be made by the French, however, solely to assure US-UK support in the event of a major Chinese Communist military invasion of Indochina and to prevent the development of a US-UK alliance from which France would be excluded.

2. Probable reactions to specific US proposals

a. Military counteraction limited to repelling the aggression in the area in which it occurred. Assuming any prior agreement at all, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand would favor this course more than any other. It is consistent with their desire to localize conflict, wherever that is possible, and to avoid acting

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as if the die had been cast for an all-out war with China. The possibility of sustaining Course 1 would become for the British most difficult, if Chinese Communist aggression spilled over into Malaya or threatened Hong Kong. The size and simultaneity of the Chinese Communist attacks would also affect the British Commonwealth countries' estimate of the realism of repelling aggression only on the soil of the attacked country. But that estimate would probably have to be developed from each situation rather than be based on definite courses of alternative action decided in advance.

The French would favor the restriction of military intervention to the area in which the Chinese Communist intervention occurred. France would make clear to the US and the UK, however, that because of French commitments in Indochina, it could not actively participate in any Burmese or Thailand operations, except perhaps, for token forces. In making even this limited commitment, the French Government would be confronted with a strongly hostile public and parliamentary opinion that would view such action as enhancing the prospects of World War III.

- b. Military counteraction including attacks on targets in Communist China directly related to Chinese Communist operations in Indochina, Burma, or Thailand.

The UK, Australia and New Zealand probably would not bind themselves in advance to counteraction against targets directly related to Chinese Communist operations in the threatened countries,

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mainly because they would not now feel able to determine what targets in Communist China could be singled out for attack without provoking a major war with China.

France would oppose any agreement in advance for attacks on targets in Communist China because of the belief that such action would pave the way for a full-scale war in the Far East that might spread to Europe.

- c. Military counteraction including retaliatory operations with conventional weapons against Communist China in general.

The reaction of the British Commonwealth countries to this course would be generally negative. Acceptance of it in advance would imply for them all that general war is inevitable and that all hope of repelling aggression where it occurs has been abandoned.

Retaliatory action against Communist China in general with conventional weapons would presumably run the risk of invoking the Sino-Soviet military assistance pact. Since implementation of the pact would endanger metropolitan France itself, French would be strongly opposed to such action.

- d. Military counteraction including the use of atomic weapons.

None of the British Commonwealth governments named would endorse this course. In each country, but most intensely in the UK, the use of atomic weapons is a sensitive domestic political issue. Not only would their use be regarded as tantamount to accepting a

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situation of unlimited war in the Far East and inviting Soviet reprisals in kind, but the feeling would also be strong that the use of atomic weapons against a predominantly non-industrialized and widely dispersed China would have little practical effect on deterring or repelling aggression in the long run.

Public opinion in France is against the use of atomic weapons, particularly since their use by one party to a dispute would inevitably expand their use by the other.

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B. How would a joint warning of the military action envisaged in 1-A affect Soviet and Chinese Communist intentions and Sino-Soviet relations?

The Communist leadership probably feels that the Western (i.e., the US) military capabilities if brought fully to bear are sufficient in the long run to jeopardize any Communist drive into Southeast Asia. The Communist leadership probably realizes, particularly on the basis of recent events, that there is danger that the West will take military action against possible Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, although there may exist some doubt concerning the scope, effectiveness, and speed of such action. The more the Communist realization of the probability of firm and effective Western counter-action is strengthened by warnings such as those considered in this paper, the less would appear to be the danger that the Chinese Communists will adopt a policy of open military intervention. A Communist decision to invade Southeast Asia in the face of a strong Western warning would in effect be a decision to precipitate a wider conflict which could easily expand into a world war. There is at present no indication of a Communist desire to extend local hostilities into such a conflict. The most effective deterrent threats will therefore be those that would force the Communists into a full realization of the difficulty of confining future aggression to a limited Communist-determined locale.

This could conceivably be done through warnings such as envisaged in 1-A, which would be effective as deterrents insofar as

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they persuaded the Communist leadership of the West's determination to utilize its apparent military capability to counter Communist aggression. However, a warning limited to counteraction only in the specific area of Southeast Asia where aggression had occurred might be interpreted by the Communists as an indication that the West intends to utilize only a part of its capability; the Communists may feel that such limited counteraction will be neither broad enough nor quick enough to counter effectively a rapid thrust at Southeast Asia. Such a limited warning might seem to leave the choice of locale for hostilities still in Communist hands and might facilitate a strategy of sapping Western strength by a series of localized wars. The Communists are aware that in Korea the US took vigorous action despite apparent indications that it did not consider Korea a vital strategic area. Nevertheless, a weakly-worded warning hedged with reservations or a warning that seemed to the Communists to be accompanied by an insufficient military commitment might conceivably have the effect of increasing the danger of Chinese intervention, by apparently indicating the absence of Western determination to stand firm in Southeast Asia. However, a warning of counter-action against targets in Communist China as well as Southeast Asia would give the Communists great pause before initiating a policy of open military intervention in Southeast Asia. The threatened use of atomic weapons would probably be interpreted by the Communists as the firmest indication of intent to utilize fully the western military capability and would, therefore, be the most effective warning.

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It is unlikely that the mere threat of counter-measures would by itself precipitate increased hostilities in Southeast Asia, unless the Communists now definitely plan an invasion, in which case they might advance their timetable to forestall the completion of Western plans for counter-measures. If the Communists plan no immediate overt aggression in Southeast Asia, a warning or threat would be unlikely to have a provocative effect on Communist strategy, since, unlike actual increased military aid -- which is not in question here -- it presumably would not alter the military balance in Southeast Asia. However if the Communist leadership should reach the conclusion that Western forces will attack the Chinese mainland regardless of Chinese Communist policies in Southeast Asia, the possible deterrent effect of the policies discussed here would be nullified and the Communists might be provoked into an attack to forestall the inevitable Western blow.

The prospect of Western military action against Communist China may become a critical factor in Sino-Soviet relations. It is not known to what extent the USSR may be committed, under existing agreements, to support Communist China in the event that hostilities extend to south China. However, it is estimated that the USSR would intervene directly if the existence of the Peiping regime were jeopardized, particularly with regard to its control over north China and Manchuria. However, it is possible that Peiping may be dissatisfied with the scope or firmness of existing military commitments and that

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Peiping feels that it has borne an undue proportion of the risks and sacrifices inherent in current Asian Communist policies, including the Korean war. A Western warning such as discussed here, particularly if it extended to retaliatory operations against Communist China in general, might contribute to possible Sino-Soviet tension on this question. It is possible that such a warning might force the USSR into a firmer commitment of all-out support of Communist China in the event of extended hostilities.

A secret warning issued through diplomatic channels would prevent questions of face from arising and would appear less provocative; it might be regarded more seriously by the Communist leadership than a public warning.

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C. Would the participation of Asian Governments (particularly Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, or India) in the joint warning be of any value? What would be the effect of the participation of Nationalist China?

anyway

The Communist leadership would look upon a joint warning primarily in realistic military terms. The deterrent effect of the warning would therefore not be greatly influenced by Asian participation, except insofar as Asian participation might seem to extend the scope of the threatened counter-measures. For example, Japanese participation in a warning might be interpreted as extending the warning to the strategic area of Northeast Asia. However, Japanese participation in a warning might enable Peiping to invoke the Sino-Soviet Treaty. The participation of the National Government on Taiwan might be interpreted by the Communists as increasing the danger of counter-action including an attempt to restore Nationalist rule on the mainland. In general, however, Asian participation would have only political and propaganda effects by making the warning appear less unilateral and by undercutting the current Communist drive to stimulate and exploit Asian "neutrality".

C. (continued) What is the likelihood that such governments would participate?

The National Government on Taiwan would be likely to participate in such a warning if invited to do so, unless the phrasing of

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the warning seemed to restrict the National Government's claim to sovereignty over all of China.

It is unlikely that, with the possible exception of the Philippines, any other Asian governments would join in a warning to Communist China. "Neutral" countries such as India, Burma, and Indonesia would oppose any such warning, let alone actively participate in it. Thailand would perhaps approve of the warning but would not risk participation because of its exposed position to Communist retaliation. Japan could not be expected to take any action that might carry with it the possibility of Sino-Soviet retaliatory action.

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D. What would be the effect of such a joint warning by the five powers:

1. On the peoples and governments of Indochina, Burma, and Thailand?

The peoples and governments of Indochina, Burma, and Thailand generally share a fundamental desire to avoid becoming the battleground for a new war, whether on a regional or global scale. Publication of a joint warning as contemplated in Section I A would therefore be judged first of all in terms of the possibility that such "intervention" in Asia might precipitate rather than prevent an overt move by Red China. Except perhaps in Burma, reaction to a public warning would be conditioned adversely by the omission of any reference to ground troops being earmarked for use in Southeast Asia in case the warning was ignored. A general commitment which appeared to lack "teeth," in the sense of strength in the area capable of back-stopping the implied threat, would appear as dangerous.

At the same time, it is quite probable that a specific suggestion that retaliation would include use of atomic weapons would produce an adverse reaction. From the standpoint of the Asian nations, a warning which specifically excluded use of atomic weapons except as retaliation-in-kind would have positive value, reducing somewhat the inevitable apprehension over publication of such a joint declaration.

Indochina

The Governments of the three Associated States would probably support any warning statement by the five-powers. Such a statement would probably be publicized by France as belated accession to views it had long advocated. Receptivity would vary with the degree of firmness

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expressed in the declaration and with the extent to which a commitment of land forces was implied. Many Vietnamese, including fence-sitters who do not support their present Government, might look with favor on an additional expression of interest in Indochina by powers other than France, feeling that French influence might thereby be somewhat displaced and independence brought nearer to achievement. At the same time, many Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians, particularly the intellectuals, would regard with apprehension any step which they felt might precipitate the entry of Chinese Communist troops into Indochina, thereby increasing the extent to which their homeland served as a battleground.

A statement implying counteraction limited to joint resistance at the point of aggression and to attack against the South China bases from which it would be launched would be likely to produce the most favorable response. Suggestions of the use of atomic weapons might, on the other hand, alarm many Vietnamese leaders. Such a step would arouse a suspicion, shared with other Asians, that the US or the West was utilizing a Southeast Asian crisis to resolve larger disputes in which the Asians are not involved.

Because the press is controlled, it is unlikely that dissenting voices would be heard from non-Communist areas. The Communist regime in Vietnam has so far publicized only sparingly the charges recently peddled in Moscow, Peking, and Paris that the US is preparing for aggression against China from bases in Thailand and by the use of KMT troops in Burma, but it is likely that repetition of such charges would be increased to counteract the morale effects of such a joint pronouncement.

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Burma

Burma, which was a major battleground in World War II and which has been rent by insurgency since 1948, is concerned, above all, with escaping the devastation of any future warfare resulting from the East-West struggle. The Government is committed to a neutral foreign policy and consistently shuns policies which might offer provocation to Communist China. Immediate reaction to a joint warning would be to shy away sharply from any association with such a project, fearing lest it precipitate events which are to be avoided at all cost. American denials of recent Communist charges that the US is supporting KMT troops in northern Burma have been greeted with skepticism by large segments of the Burmese public. The proposed announcement would tend to lend credence to local Communist allegations that US actions pose a threat to Burmese peace and security.

It is certain that internal opposition forces, in Parliament and out, would bring pressure on the Government to disentangle Burma from all foreign commitments, including US aid programs. It is possible that the Government would be threatened, and its ultimate reaction might be the result of a calculation about the virulence of its internal opposition.

Because the fear of general war is overriding, a warning which suggested that counteraction would be limited to the area of attack might produce the least adverse effect. Apprehension over a joint warning could best be reduced by emphasizing the role of the UN, as distinguished from the Western powers, in any program for dealing with aggression in Asia. All diplomatic relations are still colored by a deep

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residual suspicion of the West, and only if the threat of aggression appeared direct, immediate, and unavoidable -- which it does not as yet -- would the general Burmese reaction be other than one of suspicion, apprehension, and dissociation.

Thailand

More than any Southeast Asian state with the possible exception of the Philippines, Thailand is committed to the West in the present world struggle. Government and people would probably welcome such evidence of Western leadership in measures to defend the area against Communist aggression with greater unanimity than would be the case in either Burma or Indochina. The Thai believe that they are less likely than their neighbors to be hit first, but would still seek, behind any public warning, evidence of intention and capability to back up the implied promises. To a greater extent than is true elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Thai are receptive to the concept of joint defense. There has been some evidence of official annoyance that Thailand was left out of the recent military conference in Singapore, but feelings of offended dignity would not counteract the general welcome which would be accorded a joint pronouncement envisaging collective defense of the area.

2. On other peoples and Governments of East and South Asia?

Japan

In its present situation, Japan would have reason to fear but would appreciate the advantages of a joint declaration which expressed an intention to resist Communist aggression, especially in an area which is a source of vital foodstuffs and certain raw materials for Japan.

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In common with other nations in the area, however, it seems likely that there would be misgivings over a gesture which might appear as "throwing down the gauntlet." Ultimate judgments would be determined by beliefs about the consequences for Japan and about probable counteraction from the Communist sphere. There would be some doubts whether the US could spread itself so thin and still protect Japan in a period when Japan has little capacity for self-defense. If the warning implied total blockade of China, current fears lest the prospect of trade with the mainland be eliminated would be intensified. Most important, a suggestion of air attacks, especially if atomic weapons were envisaged, would raise the question whether Pei-p'ing would invoke the Sino-Soviet pact and undertake action against Japan. In this connection, the possibility of US offshore military operations against China proper from Japanese bases, especially if such operations were not directly related to the UN Korean operation, would be faced with considerable reluctance. The Japanese would be least apprehensive, therefore, if the declaration implied merely resistance at the point of aggression, although such a limited commitment might cause concern as to whether it represented anything more than a bluff.

It is unlikely that official Japanese statements would go beyond approval in principle. The position of the Government, which many Japanese consider a "caretaker" government and which faces elections sometime during 1952, might be weakened if it appeared to envisage active support for such a declaration.

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India

The Government of India would probably deprecate a joint declaration of intent to repel Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. While there is a sympathy for the idea of containing Chinese Communism there would be the feeling that such a public warning constituted unwarranted Western intervention in Asian affairs which would, simultaneously, provoke counteraction from the Communist side and inhibit Indian efforts to wean the Chinese Communists from Moscow. The Indian press would, for the most part, probably support these official points of view. Conservative elements would keep criticism to a minimum, but leftist elements would probably join the Communist press in bitter attacks.

Nevertheless, as the Indian Government is concerned to maintain and strengthen good relations with the US, its comment would probably be moderately phrased.

Ceylon

It is unlikely that there would be any official comment in Ceylon. The leftist press would be critical, but there would probably not be much comment in the rest of the press although there might be some echoes of Indian points of view.

Pakistan

The Government of Pakistan, while sharing Indian doubts as to the wisdom and appropriateness of such a declaration, would probably avoid official comment.

Indonesia

The key to Indonesian response to a joint declaration would probably be a fear lest the warning be interpreted as a provocative act,

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expressed somewhat less vehemently than in India and perhaps paralleling the Burmese reaction. Sensitivity to Western interference in Asian affairs, without consultation with the Asians, was manifest in considerable disquietude over the recent military conferences in Washington and Singapore.

There would probably be some opinion in the leadership, notably Soekarno, that such a warning would help to fill an existing vacuum and is to some extent unavoidable. But general fears that the declaration would increase the danger of war would reinforce the campaign currently being waged in wide circles of the press and political opinion criticizing the Government for jeopardizing Indonesia's neutral policy by commitments to the US. It is noteworthy that Vishinsky's charges before the UN of US aggression in Asia attracted little attention in Indonesia; by contrast subsequent US disclaimers have aroused unfavorable comments, revealing a continuing distrust of US motives.

Of the alternative types of warning suggested, it is probable that a threat of counteraction to repel aggression in the area where it occurred would be least annoying, and it is quite certain that a suggestion of atomic retaliation would provoke strong protest.

Philippines

Under present circumstances, publication of a joint warning would be received favorably in the Philippines, qualified only by a tendency to search for evidence of ability to carry through in case the warning were ignored. Even specific mention of the likelihood of retaliation with atomic weapons might be approved. As is the case with the Korean

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Republic, the Philippine Government looks with favor on any indication of Western determination to protect Asia from further Communist expansion. It is certain that such an announcement would bring renewed agitation for the conclusion of a general Pacific security treaty.

Malaya

Reaction in Malaya would in the last analysis be heavily influenced by the policy of the UK. The local British community would probably react favorably, believing that, by providing a "show of force," such a step might persuade many fence-sitting Malayan Chinese of the desirability of cooperating actively with the British anti-guerrilla campaign. This favorable local reaction, however, might be tempered by the fear that UK troops now in Malaya might be moved to other areas, thus reducing British capabilities to maintain internal security. Specific mention of atomic retaliation would almost certainly produce an adverse reaction from the Indian community, which is the most politically conscious group, and probably from a large segment of the Malayan Chinese.

3. On non-participating NATO countries?

The reaction of the non-participating NATO countries to any Five Power warning to Communist China would be determined largely by their assessment of the degree to which they through this warning affected the possibility of general war. The Netherlands in particular would also frown upon what they would feel was a deliberate by-passing of the UN. There would be general approval, or at least tacit acceptance, however, of a warning that declared the aggression would be stopped in the area where it occurred. For this attitude there would be the precedent of

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Korea, and the feeling that Communist China in this instance did not have even the pretext of the approach of American troops to its frontiers.

There would be somewhat more reluctance, however, to accept attacks on targets in China even though these were directly related to the Communist military effort. To date there has been no indication of official approval in the governments of these countries to any suggestions for the bombing of Manchurian airfields, for example. Similarly, under this assumed circumstance there would be evidence of concern that the contemplated attacks in China would cause the war to spread.

Operations against Communist China in general would cause great concern that 1) a general Pacific conflict would ensue in which the United States would become hopelessly involved to the detriment of European defense; 2) the Soviet Union might choose to enter the conflict. Use of the atom bomb would produce similar fears, only multiplied several times and accompanied by a moral revulsion over what would be regarded as a policy of wholesale destruction of cities and civilians and an open invitation to a general war.

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II. IN THE ACTUAL EVENT OF IDENTIFIABLE CHINESE COMMUNIST
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR THAILAND:

- A. Could the United Nations be led to declare Communist
China the aggressor and to sanction: (1) Military
counteraction to repel the aggression or (2)
retaliatory military action against Communist China
in general?

Should Communist China attack one or more of the three mentioned countries, and should the case arise in the UN Security Council, the USSR would certainly veto any military or other counteraction.

Proceeding in accordance with the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, the matter would then go to the General Assembly (GA) within twenty-four hours following a request for an emergency special session.

It is likely that the GA would first call for a cease-fire. Were this ignored, a two-thirds majority could probably be mustered in support of a resolution condemning the aggression and recommending armed action to repel it. The GA would presumably establish a unified command as in Korea, though not necessarily under the US, and adhere to the procedures outlined in the first report of its Collective Measures Committee.

The support such a resolution would receive would hinge on such factors as the circumstances attending the intervention, the country or countries attacked, the readiness of the victim to appeal to the UN and finally the desire of the UN to localize any conflict, and to avoid a complete split of East-West forces that might as a minimum destroy the basis of the UN and, at most, precipitate a general war.

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If they regarded the risk of general war as small probably all the UN members belonging to NATO would support such a resolution. Most of the Latin American states would endorse a decision to resist aggression, but would take no part in its execution. Anti-colonialism would exert a great influence on the Arab and Asian votes especially with regard to the Associated States of Indochina which are widely viewed in Asia as French puppets. In order to arouse Asian sympathy, Chinese aggression in this area would have to be on a scale sufficient to distinguish it from a mere extension of support of the civil war. Thus were the attack confined to Indochina, a large number of Arab and Asian abstentions might be expected.

In the case of Burma, much would depend on the willingness of the Burmese Government to make a timely appeal to the UN. If Burma called on the UN for assistance, this might evoke a favorable response even from India which is already somewhat apprehensive as to Chinese intentions along its northern and eastern frontiers. A complicating factor with regard to Burma's willingness to appeal to the UN would be the presence of the Chinese Nationalist forces. Their activity might be invoked as "justification" for "defensive countermeasures" by the Chinese Communists who might even extend assurances to the Burmese that their objectives were limited to the liquidation of the Chinese Nationalist troops. Burma, in any appeal to the UN might simultaneously ask for help in ridding itself of these units.

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Due to its western orientation, Thailand, in contrast to Burma, would be virtually certain to turn to the UN for aid if attacked by Chinese Communist forces. Should all three states, Burma, Indochina and Thailand, come under/broad simultaneous attack, the "identifiable" nature of the aggression would become even more evident and the support in the UN for countermeasures correspondingly more universal.

In any case, the presence of a UN observation group on the spot, as in Korea, might be a helpful factor in promptly informing the UN of the facts and influencing doubtful votes.

A GA resolution to repel aggression would probably be confined to just that, and any effort to spell out retaliatory measures against Communist China as a whole, would raise the spectre of general war and thus might impair UN unity. Any such resolution would presumably be phrased in general terms leaving to implication the authority of the Unified Command to adopt necessary military measures. There would certainly be widespread aversion to use of atomic weapons or mass bombing of Chinese population centers.

- B. What additional moral and material support could the five powers expect to receive as a result of such UN sanction? What additional moral and material support might they receive even if the United Nations failed to take prompt and effective action?

It is unlikely that as many nations would contribute military forces as in Korea, but the absence of such small token contingents would constitute more of a moral than a material loss. Other aid,

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expressed in the declaration and with the extent to which a commitment of land forces was implied. Many Vietnamese, including fence-sitters who do not support their present Government, might look with favor on an additional expression of interest in Indochina by powers other than France, feeling that French influence might thereby be somewhat displaced and independence brought nearer to achievement. At the same time, many Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians, particularly the intellectuals, would regard with apprehension any step which they felt might precipitate the entry of Chinese Communist troops into Indochina, thereby increasing the extent to which their homeland served as a battleground.

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Burma

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residual suspicion of the West, and only if the threat of aggression appeared direct, immediate, and unavoidable -- which it does not as yet -- would the general Burmese reaction be other than one of suspicion, apprehension, and dissociation.

Thailand

More than any Southeast Asian state with the possible exception of the Philippines, Thailand is committed to the West in the present world struggle. Government and people would probably welcome such evidence of Western leadership in measures to defend the area against Communist aggression with greater unanimity than would be the case in either Burma or Indochina. The Thai believe that they are less likely than their neighbors to be hit first, but would still seek, behind any public warning, evidence of intention and capability to back up the implied promises. To a greater extent than is true elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Thai are receptive to the concept of joint defense. There has been some evidence of official annoyance that Thailand was left out of the recent military conference in Singapore, but feelings of offended dignity would not counteract the general welcome which would be accorded a joint pronouncement envisaging collective defense of the area.

2. On other peoples and Governments of East and South Asia?

Japan

In its present situation, Japan would have reason to fear but would appreciate the advantages of a joint declaration which expressed an intention to resist Communist aggression, especially in an area which is a source of vital foodstuffs and certain raw materials for Japan.

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In common with other nations in the area, however, it seems likely that there would be misgivings over a gesture which might appear as "throwing down the gauntlet." Ultimate judgments would be determined by beliefs about the consequences for Japan and about probable counteraction from the Communist sphere. There would be some doubts whether the US could spread itself so thin and still protect Japan in a period when Japan has little capacity for self-defense. If the warning implied total blockade of China, current fears lest the prospect of trade with the mainland be eliminated would be intensified. Most important, a suggestion of air attacks, especially if atomic weapons were envisaged, would raise the question whether Pei-p'ing would invoke the Sino-Soviet pact and undertake action against Japan. In this connection, the possibility of US offshore military operations against China proper from Japanese bases, especially if such operations were not directly related to the UN Korean operation, would be faced with considerable reluctance. The Japanese would be least apprehensive, therefore, if the declaration implied merely resistance at the point of aggression, although such a limited commitment might cause concern as to whether it represented anything more than a bluff.

It is unlikely that official Japanese statements would go beyond approval in principle. The position of the Government, which many Japanese consider a "caretaker" government and which faces elections sometime during 1952, might be weakened if it appeared to envisage active support for such a declaration.

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India

The Government of India would probably deprecate a joint declaration of intent to repel Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. While there is a sympathy for the idea of containing Chinese Communism there would be the feeling that such a public warning constituted unwarranted Western intervention in Asian affairs which would, simultaneously, provoke counteraction from the Communist side and inhibit Indian efforts to wean the Chinese Communists from Moscow. The Indian press would, for the most part, probably support these official points of view. Conservative elements would keep criticism to a minimum, but leftist elements would probably join the Communist press in bitter attacks.

Nevertheless, as the Indian Government is concerned to maintain and strengthen good relations with the US, its comment would probably be moderately phrased.

Ceylon

It is unlikely that there would be any official comment in Ceylon. The leftist press would be critical, but there would probably not be much comment in the rest of the press although there might be some echoes of Indian points of view.

Pakistan

The Government of Pakistan, while sharing Indian doubts as to the wisdom and appropriateness of such a declaration, would probably avoid official comment.

Indonesia

The key to Indonesian response to a joint declaration would probably be a fear lest the warning be interpreted as a provocative act,

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expressed somewhat less vehemently than in India and perhaps paralleling the Burmese reaction. Sensitivity to Western interference in Asian affairs, without consultation with the Asians, was manifest in considerable disquietude over the recent military conferences in Washington and Singapore.

There would probably be some opinion in the leadership, notably Soekarno, that such a warning would help to fill an existing vacuum and is to some extent unavoidable. But general fears that the declaration would increase the danger of war would reinforce the campaign currently being waged in wide circles of the press and political opinion criticizing the Government for jeopardizing Indonesia's neutral policy by commitments to the US. It is noteworthy that Vishinsky's charges before the UN of US aggression in Asia attracted little attention in Indonesia; by contrast subsequent US disclaimers have aroused unfavorable comments, revealing a continuing distrust of US motives.

Of the alternative types of warning suggested, it is probable that a threat of counteraction to repel aggression in the area where it occurred would be least annoying, and it is quite certain that a suggestion of atomic retaliation would provoke strong protest.

Philippines

Under present circumstances, publication of a joint warning would be received favorably in the Philippines, qualified only by a tendency to search for evidence of ability to carry through in case the warning were ignored. Even specific mention of the likelihood of retaliation with atomic weapons might be approved. As is the case with the Korean

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Republic, the Philippine Government looks with favor on any indication of Western determination to protect Asia from further Communist expansion. It is certain that such an announcement would bring renewed agitation for the conclusion of a general Pacific security treaty.

Malaya

Reaction in Malaya would in the last analysis be heavily influenced by the policy of the UK. The local British community would probably react favorably, believing that, by providing a "show of force," such a step might persuade many fence-sitting Malayan Chinese of the desirability of cooperating actively with the British anti-guerrilla campaign. This favorable local reaction, however, might be tempered by the fear that UK troops now in Malaya might be moved to other areas, thus reducing British capabilities to maintain internal security. Specific mention of atomic retaliation would almost certainly produce an adverse reaction from the Indian community, which is the most politically conscious group, and probably from a large segment of the Malayan Chinese.

3. On non-participating NATO countries?

The reaction of the non-participating NATO countries to any Five Power warning to Communist China would be determined largely by their assessment of the degree to which they through this warning affected the possibility of general war. The Netherlands in particular would also frown upon what they would feel was a deliberate by-passing of the UN. There would be general approval, or at least tacit acceptance, however, of a warning that declared the aggression would be stopped in the area where it occurred. For this attitude there would be the precedent of

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Korea, and the feeling that Communist China in this instance did not have even the pretext of the approach of American troops to its frontiers.

There would be somewhat more reluctance, however, to accept attacks on targets in China even though these were directly related to the Communist military effort. To date there has been no indication of official approval in the governments of these countries to any suggestions for the bombing of Manchurian airfields, for example. Similarly, under this assumed circumstance there would be evidence of concern that the contemplated attacks in China would cause the war to spread.

Operations against Communist China in general would cause great concern that 1) a general Pacific conflict would ensue in which the United States would become hopelessly involved to the detriment of European defense; 2) the Soviet Union might choose to enter the conflict. Use of the atom bomb would produce similar fears, only multiplied several times and accompanied by a moral revulsion over what would be regarded as a policy of wholesale destruction of cities and civilians and an open invitation to a general war.

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II. IN THE ACTUAL EVENT OF IDENTIFIABLE CHINESE COMMUNIST
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR THAILAND:

- A. Could the United Nations be led to declare Communist
China the aggressor and to sanction: (1) Military
counteraction to repel the aggression or (2)
retaliatory military action against Communist China
in general?

Should Communist China attack one or more of the three mentioned countries, and should the case arise in the UN Security Council, the USSR would certainly veto any military or other counteraction.

Proceeding in accordance with the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, the matter would then go to the General Assembly (GA) within twenty-four hours following a request for an emergency special session.

It is likely that the GA would first call for a cease-fire. Were this ignored, a two-thirds majority could probably be mustered in support of a resolution condemning the aggression and recommending armed action to repel it. The GA would presumably establish a unified command as in Korea, though not necessarily under the US, and adhere to the procedures outlined in the first report of its Collective Measures Committee.

The support such a resolution would receive would hinge on such factors as the circumstances attending the intervention, the country or countries attacked, the readiness of the victim to appeal to the UN and finally the desire of the UN to localize any conflict, and to avoid a complete split of East-West forces that might as a minimum destroy the basis of the UN and, at most, precipitate a general war.

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If they regarded the risk of general war as small probably all the UN members belonging to NATO would support such a resolution. Most of the Latin American states would endorse a decision to resist aggression, but would take no part in its execution. Anti-colonialism would exert a great influence on the Arab and Asian votes especially with regard to the Associated States of Indochina which are widely viewed in Asia as French puppets. In order to arouse Asian sympathy, Chinese aggression in this area would have to be on a scale sufficient to distinguish it from a mere extension of support of the civil war. Thus were the attack confined to Indochina, a large number of Arab and Asian abstentions might be expected.

In the case of Burma, much would depend on the willingness of the Burmese Government to make a timely appeal to the UN. If Burma called on the UN for assistance, this might evoke a favorable response even from India which is already somewhat apprehensive as to Chinese intentions along its northern and eastern frontiers. A complicating factor with regard to Burma's willingness to appeal to the UN would be the presence of the Chinese Nationalist forces. Their activity might be invoked as "justification" for "defensive countermeasures" by the Chinese Communists who might even extend assurances to the Burmese that their objectives were limited to the liquidation of the Chinese Nationalist troops. Burma, in any appeal to the UN might simultaneously ask for help in ridding itself of these units.

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Due to its western orientation, Thailand, in contrast to Burma, would be virtually certain to turn to the UN for aid if attacked by Chinese Communist forces. Should all three states, Burma, Indochina and Thailand, come under/broad simultaneous attack, the "identifiable" nature of the aggression would become even more evident and the support in the UN for countermeasures correspondingly more universal.

In any case, the presence of a UN observation group on the spot, as in Korea, might be a helpful factor in promptly informing the UN of the facts and influencing doubtful votes.

A GA resolution to repel aggression would probably be confined to just that, and any effort to spell out retaliatory measures against Communist China as a whole, would raise the spectre of general war and thus might impair UN unity. Any such resolution would presumably be phrased in general terms leaving to implication the authority of the Unified Command to adopt necessary military measures. There would certainly be widespread aversion to use of atomic weapons or mass bombing of Chinese population centers.

- B. What additional moral and material support could the five powers expect to receive as a result of such UN sanction? What additional moral and material support might they receive even if the United Nations failed to take prompt and effective action?

It is unlikely that as many nations would contribute military forces as in Korea, but the absence of such small token contingents would constitute more of a moral than a material loss. Other aid,

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of a non-military character, (medical supplies, food, clothing, etc.) would be furnished by a substantial number of UN members not otherwise participating in the conflict. 2.

If the UN failed to take prompt and effective action, this would tend to reduce the additional moral and material support the five powers might receive, particularly from nations outside of NATO.

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C. What would be the Chinese Communist reaction to the actual execution of retaliatory joint military action against Communist China? The Soviet reaction -- The effect on Sino-Soviet Relations?

Whether the actual execution of retaliatory military action followed upon a deliberately disregarded warning or not, Communist planning unquestionably would have taken into account the likelihood of military counter-action. The effect of such military counter-action on Sino-Soviet relations might be to lead additional impetus to Chinese demands for a firmer Soviet commitment in support of Peiping's activities, although it is probable that the extent of the Soviet commitment would have been determined before the Communist decision to invade.

The degree of Soviet aid to China under these circumstances would depend upon (1) the nature, scope, and degree of success of the Western counter-action, and (2) the degree to which the existence of the Pei-p'ing regime seemed to be jeopardized. It is estimated that Moscow would take any action it deemed necessary to prevent the loss of Pei-p'ing's control in north China and Manchuria, regardless of the consequent risk of global war. Presumably the initial Communist action would only have been made with full realization of the risks involved.

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D. What would be the psychological and political effect within Communist China of the actual execution of retaliatory military action against Communist China?

Counteraction limited to naval blockade and the conventional bombing of selected targets would probably have comparatively little psychological and political effect in China, except possibly in the areas immediately affected, where unrest and dissatisfaction with the regime might increase. A general air offensive, including the use of atomic weapons, might lead to some loss of support for Peiping's policies in the cities. An air offensive unaccompanied by invasion or organized rebellion, however, would provide no focus for popular dissatisfaction with the regime. On the contrary, Western air action against the Chinese mainland would be utilized by the Communists as "proof" of western aggressive intentions, and might serve to create a unity among some segments of the Chinese population that would more than offset the dissatisfaction with the regime's policies that it would create in other segments of the population.

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- E. How would the governments and peoples of Indochina, Burma and Thailand react to the actual execution of joint military counteraction against the Chinese Communist military intervention:
1. If such counteraction were limited to efforts to repel the aggression in Indochina, Burma, or Thailand?

The following comments are based on the assumption that the Communist aggression is "identifiable" by the Southeast Asians, and it is probable that their definition of aggression will vary somewhat from that made by the United States. As a consequence of a basic hope that the arena for World War III can somehow be moved elsewhere, there may be a reluctance to face the reality of aggression when it occurs, until events have prejudiced effective counteraction by the countries themselves. Reactions to countermeasures by the Five Powers would, therefore, be a reflection of the stage of developing thought in the area about the nature of Communist moves. A drive against Burma or Indochina, might well be in the form of stepped-up aid to local insurgents and provision of "volunteer" cadres. These measures, although sufficient to tip the balance militarily, might not be recognized by the Governments concerned as "identifiable aggression".

Subject to the reservation noted above, it is probable that most of the Asian nations would consider a clear act of aggression by Communist China in any one of the three specified countries as the beginning of, or at least the prelude to, a "general" war. In India, Burma, and Indonesia, at least, the identification of the UN with any

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counteraction would facilitate their agreement and cooperation, but it is possible that Communist charges that the UN has become a "tool" of the US would also find increasing receptivity.

a. Indochina. In the event of Communist intervention in Burma the Vietnamese would react favorably to counteraction at the point of attack, assuming that such measures involved use of Western ground troops. An effective effort to repel the aggression would provide reassurance of Western support in the event of an attack on Indochina. An attack on Thailand would create the threat of a flank attack of Indochina, and the greater danger would lead to increased hope for Western counteraction. If an attack were launched against Indochina, approval of countermeasures would be contingent upon evidence of effective support; effectiveness would probably be judged chiefly in relation to the number of ground forces dispatched to supplement Franco-Vietnamese troops. Political commitments regarding Vietnam's status might affect the receptivity to Western military action in that country.

b. Burma. It is certain that Burmese anxieties would be greatly intensified in case of clear aggression in any of the three countries. An attack on Indochina would arouse conflicting reactions: a general tendency to favor the Viet Minh as a nationalist movement would be shaken somewhat by projection of the image of similar Chinese assistance to Burmese insurgents, but relief that Burma had not been

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invaded might perpetuate present apathy despite the continuing threat. It is possible that the Government gives credence to reports of an agreement between India and China assigning Southeast Asian spheres of influence (with Burma falling to India).

In the initial stages of an attack on Burma itself, it is likely that fear of war on home ground would delay or jeopardize recognition of a clear threat, resulting in equivocation and delay which would further restrict the effectiveness of Burmese resistance and of joint counterefforts in Burma.

o. Thailand. While approving of counteraction against an attack on any of the three countries, Thai responses and efforts would be conditioned chiefly by desire to improve the capacity for self-defense. Prompt assurance of direct assistance would probably be sought in any crisis period. Thus, if countermeasures against/aggression in Indochina were manifestly inadequate and it became quickly apparent that Thailand was exposed to imminent threat of invasion, Thai support for joint action would waver and possibly dissipate.

2. If such counteraction included naval blockade and the conventional bombing of selective targets in Communist China?

Reaction in any of three countries attacked would probably be generally favorable, unless blockade and bombardment were substituted for, rather than added to, effective countermeasures at the point of attack. In Burma, it is possible that a counteraction limited to attacks on China might be most favorably received, based on the desire

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to prevent widespread fighting on Burmese soil and perhaps on a belief that such attacks on the mainland of China would effectively contain or deter Chinese intervention in Burma.

3. If such counteraction included a general air offensive against Communist China including the use of atomic weapons?

The widespread revulsion of feeling concerning use of atomic weapons, which are viewed essentially as instruments of mass-destruction, is probably so strong that, even under the crisis of actual attack, the three nations would oppose such a program.

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II.

F. How would other peoples and governments in East and South Asia react to the actual execution of joint military counter-action against Communist China in each of the three cases indicated above?

If Communist intervention appeared as a clear-cut act, the East and South Asian states would give tacit support to counter-measures by the Five Powers. At least initially, however, punitive action against China would probably be opposed. If the developing situation indicated Chinese intention to persist in operations and the necessity for retaliation as a contribution to joint defense, reluctance could be expected to wither gradually. Except for the Philippines, where sentiment would from the outset support vigorous counteraction, these reactions would be shared by the Southeast Asian nations and India. Japanese support would come in question chiefly if operations were to be conducted from Japanese bases, in which case, although the Government could not estop such operations, popular apprehensions over the possible invocation of the Sino-Soviet pact might weaken the Government's position and limit popular support pending evidence of the effectiveness of the operations.

Asian responses would probably be most nearly favorable if the UN were identified with the counteraction. The most adverse reaction would accompany atomic retaliation.

G. Would there be any important reactions elsewhere?

See Section II A above.

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H. How would the powers engaged in this joint military action then regard the active employment of Chinese Nationalist forces against the Chinese Communists?

Initially the British would probably oppose the use of Nationalist forces if Chinese Communist interventions were on a small and ineffective scale. In the event joint military action failed to repel aggression in any one of the threatened countries, the UK would probably be forced to abandon open opposition to the use of Nationalist forces, particularly if the scale of British armed support in any one of the attacked countries was token and inadequate. Although the UK has little faith in the ability of the Nationalists to influence events militarily on the Chinese mainland and would accept the use of Nationalist forces very reluctantly, Australia and New Zealand, which have not recognized Communist China, would probably more willingly accept the decision to use these troops.

The French would probably consent to the use of Chinese Nationalist forces only under two conditions: (1) that the identifiable Chinese Communist aggression in Indochina had been major; and (2) that the aggression had provoked a general war on China, in which all the forces in being at the disposal of the West were considered essential to repulse the Communist attack.

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I. What would be the reaction of the mainland Chinese to the employment of Chinese Nationalist forces against the Chinese Communists?

If Nationalist troops were employed against the Communists on the Chinese mainland, most Chinese would probably adopt an attitude of "wait and see". Many potential dissidents would be strongly tempted to defect, as opportunity arose, to a successfully established invasion force which was not closely identified with the Kuomintang leadership and system. But since the attitudes of mainland Chinese toward the Kuomintang has not changed greatly since 1949, a purely Kuomintang operation probably would not attract extensive mainland cooperation.

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J. How would other peoples and governments of East and South Asia then regard the employment of Chinese Nationalist forces against the Chinese Communists?

The use of Chinese Nationalist forces would probably not be opposed, if the counteraction were clearly presented as a case of repelling aggression and the impression avoided that the war was being used to facilitate the restoration of the Nationalist Government with which most Asians have little sympathy. For this reason, reactions would be less favorable if Nationalist troops were used against China proper than if they were deployed with other forces in defense of Southeast Asia. Even within Southeast Asia, however, their reception would not be enthusiastic. The Vietnamese recall the occupation of Tonkin by Lu Han's forces in 1945-1946; the Burmese had unhappy experiences with Nationalist troops during World War II and are deeply suspicious of the objectives of the Nationalist forces now deployed in northern Burma. The Thai would prefer to have other than Nationalist troops assigned to the defense of Thailand. It is unlikely that India or Indonesia would oppose their use if, as the war developed, exigencies of manpower seemed to require the step -- as long as the Nationalists were not used as a political weapon to restore Chiang's position on the mainland. The Philippines would support the use of Nationalist troops, both offensively and defensively.

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- K. If there had been no prior agreement such as that contemplated in I-A and if the United Nations failed to take prompt and effective action, would the United Kingdom and France be likely to join with the United States in retaliatory military action against Communist China itself? Would any other powers be likely to support the United States, United Kingdom, and France in these circumstances?

If the UN failed to take prompt and effective action, it is unlikely that the UK would join with the US in the course suggested. In principle, the UK is opposed at the present time to resisting Chinese Communist aggression except on the ground where it occurs. The UK, Australia, and New Zealand would view retaliatory action against Communist China itself as almost certain to precipitate general war.

In the absence of prior US-UK-French agreement and of effective UN action, France would almost certainly ^{not} join the US in retaliatory military action against Communist China arising out of the latter's attack on Burma or Thailand. Its attitude as regards an attack against Indochina under the same circumstances would depend in part on the French military position. If the French forces were driven out or destroyed in the initial action, it is possible that the French would acknowledge their defeat and seek to write off Indochina by pressing for a general settlement of the Far Eastern problem. If, however, the French forces were able to maintain themselves in Indochina in the initial stages of the attack, France would most likely urge US action against Communist China itself although it would probably tend to view such action as primarily a US responsibility and would not divert any substantial part of its metropolitan forces to the Far Eastern theater.

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- L. What would be the consequences of unilateral US military action against China proper, all other powers having refused to participate?

Assuming US unilateral action were taken against the wishes and without the approval of its major allies, the consequences of such action except in the Philippines, Formosa, and the Republic of Korea would be determined, in large part, by the following considerations:

1. The intention and capacity of the dissident allies to maneuver Asian countries into political opposition or "neutralism" to US actions against China.
2. The "identifiable" nature of Communist aggression that precipitated such action. For example, it is conceivable that US military intervention in Indochina would be sought by the Franco-Vietnamese forces in response to an emergency not generally recognized as "identifiable" Chinese aggression. In this case, the suspicions of Asian countries concerning US motives in Asia would be increased as would their fear of becoming embroiled in a power struggle between US and the Communist bloc for hegemony in Asia. On the other hand, a clearly overt invasion of any of the Asian countries would appear, in their minds, to justify US action so long as such action were clearly related to the defense of Asia, e.g. including vigorous US counteraction in areas that in the initial stages of action may have been occupied by Communist forces.

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3. Assuming general agreement on the definition of "identifiable" aggression, there would be considerable concern, on the part of the Asian countries, over the determination and military capabilities of the US to effectively protect their countries from Communist military action. The initial estimate of each country on this score would largely determine its response and the developing military situation, its actions. Feelings would teeter between concern over security of the homeland and fear of spreading war, and no firm prediction is possible as to which would prove dominant, in the absence of a more specific picture of the military situation which would develop.

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